The Quang 1205 Document

The Quang 1,205 Document surfaced in the archives of the former Soviet Union just after Clinton's first term in office began. Dr. Stephen Morris, a Harvard Researcher, while researching the FSU's archives came across the document, realized it spoke of American Prisoners of War in Vietnamese custody and got it out.

The Clinton Administrations first inclination was to classify the document top secret. You see, President Clinton had other ideas in mind. He was preparing to:

Lift US objections to the World Bank lending IMF funds to Vietnam;

Over the objections of virtually every Veteran Organization, Family members, over 50 former Prisoners of War and the POW/MIA community in general, he lifted the US imposed trade embargo against Vietnam;

Less than two years later, again over the objections of the Veteran Organizations, Family members, 50+ former Prisoners of War and the POW/MIA community he re-estalished diplomatic relations with Vietnam.

So the 1205 document had to be trashed. Not ever debrieifing general Quang, who is still alive, the US Government said that the document was a fake. it was a plant. But planted by whom and for what purpose? The Soviets were the allies of Vietnam at the time and since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russians have needed US help. Why wouldn't they have destroyed a document that they had purportedly planted? Unless....

The Quang 1205 Document

General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR Main Intelligence GRU

Title: Report of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnamese Peoples Army

General Lieutenant Chan Van Quang at the Meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the PRV

15 September 1972

Page 17

In addition to these questions in accordance with direction from the Politburo I will report to you today on American POWs captured on the various fronts of Indochina.

Dealing with American prisoners has always been under the jurisdiction of the Politburo and has been reflected in its decisions, such as the decision number 21 DCT dated 23 March 1971, and the decision dated 4 April 1972.

Both of these decisions touch on the questions of exploiting these American POWs captured in time of war. This disturbs the public opinion of the whole world and the USA. There are various thoughts on the question of American POWs. Some of these are correct, others are not, but even among us there is a group of comrades whose opinions who differ from the opinion of the Politburo. In their judgments these comrades are not taking into considerations the particulars of the developing situation and the inherent difficulties. These opinions hinder us in our search for methods of resolving the question of American POWs.

Honored comrades! The question of American POWs is very complex. World public opinion, and the public opinion of our brother socialist nations want to know the exact number of POWs located in North Vietnam. Allow me to inform you specifically about this question. From the time that the USA introduced their troops into Vietnam, expanded the air war against North Vietnam, and widened the general scale of their aggression, onto the territories of Laos, Cambodia, we have captured a very large number of American POWs on the fronts of Indochina. At first the number of American POWs was not large, and world public opinion paid little attention to them.

However, after the imperialists of the USA started massive bombing and off shore bombardment by the 7th fleet on 5 August 1964 of the territory of North Vietnam, after expanding their aggression onto the territories of Laos and Cambodia, the number of American POWs in North Vietnam grew day by day.

The number of American POWs in the DRV has not to this day been made public, we have kept this figure secret. At today's session of the Politburo, I will report to you, Comrades, the exact number of American POWs.

The total number of American POWs captured to date on the fronts of Indochina, in other words in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia totals 1205 people. Of this number, 671 people were captured in North Vietnam and 143 pilots (were captured) in South Vietnam. This means the total number of pilots, and diversionary [special operations] (American advisors on special craft), captured on the territories on North and South Vietnam comprise 814 people. In addition, from other categories of American servicemen in Indochina, we have captured 391 people, including in South Vietnam -- 283, in Cambodia -- 65, in Laos -- 43 people. 814 and 391 comprise 1205 people.

Here is more data on the 1205 POWs.

In North Vietnam, we have captured 624 American pilots, including: 7 Colonels, 85 Lt Colonels, 183 Majors, in other words, the total number of senior officers of the US Air Force and Navy comprise 275 people. The 624 American pilots include 3 astronauts, in other words, three people who have completed the necessary training for space flight. For instance, Jim Katlo, (who was) captured in the vicinity of Hanoi. This figure also includes 15 U.S. Air Force aces, having more 4000 flight hours each: Norman Klarvisto, Carmet, Jim Intist Shasht and others. Such are the specific data on American pilots captured in North Vietnam.

Among the other 47 prisoners, captured in North Vietnam, there are 36 special operations forces advisors who were inserted in the border region between DRV with Laos, individual special operations personnel who were conducting reconnaissance of transportation routes from helicopters and reconnaissance vessels; and several seamen who abandoned their damaged vessels and were picked up by us. Therefore the figures 624 plus 47 add up to 671.

In South Vietnam, we have captured 143 U.S. aircrew members, mainly helicopter pilots, and some jet pilots.

Among the 391 American POWs captured in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, we have 9 Colonels, 19 Lt Colonels and 52 Majors. The remainder are officers from captain down, and American enlisted men.

In summary, I want to remind you that the 1205 American POWs presently in prisons of North Vietnam are:

- pilots, captured in North Vietnam - 624:

- pilots, captured in South Vietnam - 143;

- special forces and other American servicemen, captured in North Vietnam - 47;

- American servicemen of other categories - 391, of whom 283 were captured in South Vietnam, 65 in Cambodia, and 43 in Laos.

A few words about the political views and the inclinations of American POWs.

368 POWs and progressive inclinations. They well understand that this war is unjust and unpopular on their part. They condemn the American administration and express a decisive protest against this war. We will be able to liberate these 368 POWs first of all under the condition that, as a result of the struggle of the progressive peoples of the world (including the American people), a favorable international environment will take shape, thus forcing Nixon to more toward a resolution of the political issue. We are carrying out work with this category of POWs to explain to them the aggressive nature of the war being carried on by the Nixon administration and the nature of the Nguyen Van Thieu regime, and also to make them understand the unjust character of this war which is inflicting great damage on the American people. One can assert that this group of POWs is progressive in their political views.

372 of the POWs hold neutral views, i.e., their political outlook is not fully progressive, yet not too reactionary. We fully believe that they still do not clearly understand the role of the American administration in unleashing the aggressive war in Indochina.

The remainder of the POWs hold reactionary views. In spite of the work carried on to explain to them the real state of things, they have not changed their reactionary views.

The following is a summation:

- 368 POWs holding progressive views can be liberated first of all;

- 372 POWs hold neutral positions;

- 465 POWs hold reactionary views.

All the POWs among the senior officers hold reactionary views, i.e., they do not condemn Nixon, they do not protest against his policies, and they invalidate our course of action. We understand that those officers are products of rich families. Their reactionary views are precisely a result of this.

We well understand that the question of American POWs has great significance for the resolution of the South Vietnamese problem. We must continue propagandistic and educational work with the American POWs, leading to their understanding of the nature of the aggressive war which the USA is carrying out in Vietnam, as well as the senseless obstinence of Nixon, which only delays the liberation of POWs and their return to their homeland.

Soon we will free several POWs in order to put pressure on Nixon's government, observe his reactions and those of the American public, as well as to demonstrate our good intentions in this matter.

Thus, the 1205 American POWs captured on the fronts of Indochina (in North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia), presently kept in prisons in North Vietnam represent a significant force in the American army, a basic part of which is made up of American pilots.

The large number of American pilots imprisoned during the time of Johnson and Nixon inflicted huge damage on the US Air Force. This should cause the government of the USA and Nixon himself to reflect. We intend to resolve the question of American POWs in the following manner:

1. The government of the USA must demonstrate concessions, in other words, a cease fire and the removal Nguyen Van Thieu, and then both sides can begin discussing the question of repatriating POWs to the Nixon government.

2. During the time that the American side is resolving the above mentioned problems, we can free some more pilots from the number who are progressively inclined. Nixon should not hinder the return of these pilots to their homeland and not undertake any disciplinary measures toward them.

Here then are the principles on the basis of which we may resolve the problem of American POWs. However, Nixon continues to resist the solution of the Vietnamese question, thereby delaying the resolution of the problem of American POWs.

I have reported these specific numbers and fundamental aspects of the problem of American POWs to the Politburo. But we have comrades who also don't understand this problem correctly. It is necessary to resolve this question taking into account stabilizing the military and the political aspects of the Vietnamese problem. If we take a path of concession toward Americans and liberate POWs we would be at a great loss. That is why our point of view on this issue remains the same; this issue must be resolved on the basis of military and political stabilization aspects.

The composition of the 1205 POWs creates certain difficulties for us. Most importantly, 1205 POWs, particularly pilots, is a great loss to the American Army, particularly the U.S. Air Force. At the same time we are able to collect data about American weapons and valuable scientific materials about U.S. Army (for instance, material on how to utilize different type weaponry, tactical/technical characteristics of the aircraft, instructions of the air force, as well as materials about other types of armament of the U.S. Army.)

We have been able to uncover U.S. intentions in the international arena and on a number of other issues, which are related to war in Indochina.

That is why we are convinced that our position concerning POWs was and continues to be correct. If we could successfully resolve the POW issue, then the other issues will not exert any influence in our policy toward the United States, that is why we right now we are concentrating on the successful resolution of this problem, why we study materials from interrogations from American aviators who were shot down over North Vietnam and American scientists who were captured in this war (particularly Air Force specialists, as well as scientists in other technical areas). Their loss is a major demoralizing factor for the American Army, because in no other war have there been so many captured Americans as there are in this war of aggression.

1205 American POWs are kept in the prison of North Vietnam -- that is a large number. For now, we have officially published a list of 368 POWs, the rest are not acknowledged. The government of the United States is aware of this, but they don't know the exact number of POWs, or they perhaps only assume an approximate number based on their losses. Therefore in accordance with the decree from the Politburo we keep secret the number of POWs.

We are continuing to collect and study materials from POW interrogations...

[Continuation not provided.]

The people who authenticated this document ranged from Dr. Henry Kissinger, who was negotiating with the Vietnamese during the time this report was given, to Former National Security Adviser Brzezinski who was so disturbed by this document he called into question the wisdom of normalizing relations until the document was answered.

Dr. Rudolf Germanovich Pikhoya, the Chief State Archivist of the Russian Federation in August of 1995 said, "I am absolutely certain that the numbers-that is the numbers of POW's cited by General Quang are true."

General Dmitri Volkogonov: "I have studied exhaustively the mechanism used to gather this document, and I can state that I do not know of any case where such information could have been fabricated."

Garnet Bill Bell Says:

Garnett "Bill" Bell, who was once a senior analyst for DoD in Hanoi resigned from DoD after testifying at the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. Mr. Bell took his oathe to "tell the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth" seriously, unlike several other bureaucrats. This resulted in adverse work conditions and he resigned.

He is fluent in Vietnamese; in fact he married a Vietnamese National who was killed during the war. Mr. Bell is one of the world's foremost experts on the Vietnamese as well as the POW/MIA issue.

The following is a working paper that Bell revised December 7, 1994, for the Department of Defense. He uploaded this working paper on January 7, 1995 when the "Quang 1205" Document was written about on the Veterans Bulletin Board, Vietnam Section on Prodigy.


He has much, much more to say about this document.

"Henry Serex - Peter Matthes"

One must wonder if Henry Serex and Peter Matthes were not progressive enough for the Vietnamese and therefore never returned.

Sattelite imagery picked up both Serex' and Matthes' Escape and Evade codes in 1992 but the DOD debunked these separate escape and evade codes as natural phenomenons.

The Department of Defense can get away with that because YOU allow it. By apathy. By non involvement. By waiting for the next guy, who is waiting for you, to get involved.

Meanwhile there are men who may be alive and trying desparately to remember how to speak English. Think about it.

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